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Others have recently spoken to you about the
social and psychological conditions of law school
life, and no doubt conversations on that intriguing topic will command your attention for
some time to come. What I want to talk to you
about today is a different subject. My concern is
with what you will be doing in law school intellectually speaking, that is, what are we asking
you to do with your minds as you do the work of
law school: reading your cases; preparing for
class; asking and responding to questions in the
classroom; and thinking and talking about legal
questions with each other over coffee or lunch.
The process may well seem new and strange to
you, very different from what you have done in
college, and I hope that I can make some remarks that will help to prepare you for it.
I don't want to attribute to any of you the sort
of ignorance I once had, but it is possible that
some of you think-as many non-lawyers dothat the law is at bottom very simple. I once
thought that what the word "law" referred to
was, obviously enough, the laws themselves.
And I naturally expected that the laws were all
written down somewhere to be looked up and
applied to life. The rules, once found, were
simple enough; the mystery of the law had to do
with their location. What mainly distinguished
me from the lawyer, I thought, was that he knew
where to find the rules and how to be sure he
had found all of them. What I conceived of as
*This is a revised version of a talk I gave to the class that
entered The University of Chicago Law School in the Fall of
1976. The revision has benefited from the helpful criticism
of my colleagues Walter Blum, Edmund Kitch, Edward Levi,
Bernard Meltzer, Phil Neal, Geoffrey Stone, Hans Zeisel,
and Franklin Zimring. It is my own views, however, not
those of an institution, that are expressed here.
**Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
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the "application" of the rules Was simple
enough. You move to a new state and of course
you need to obtain a new driver's license and
automobile registration. You send for or pick up
the appropriate information, and follow the directions until the process is completed. Or take
traffic regulations: it is easy enough to understand that you should stop at a stop sign, yield at
a yield sign, and the like. The rules are clear
enough: you either follow or disobey them.
It is true that the law often works in this simple way, perhaps the vast majority of the time,
for in many situations the law is sufficiently intelligible for people to use it easily, and
sufficiently fair to occasion no feeling that there
is something deeply wrong that calls out for correction. What is more, strongly held values support this simple view of the law: to one raised in
a democratic system it seems that this is how the
law must work. The rules are for my guidance,
after all, and they must be intelligible to me. I
vote for candidates on the "issues," which are
frequently stated in the form of proposed legislation or regulation; to be competent as a voter,
which my political system no doubt rightly assumes I am, I must be able to understand the
laws. If they are unclear it is certainly not
through any necessity but because they have
been made so by lawyers, eager to maintain the
profitable rystique of their profession.
But this simple view does not account for all
the ways in which the law works, and omits entirely what is most interesting, difficult, and important in what we do. Think for a moment
what would follow if it were true that the activity
of law consisted of nothing more than memorizing certain clear rules and learning where to
find the others. First, both law school and the
practice of law would be intolerably boring. On
the face of it, few things could be more dull than
simply memorizing large numbers of rules or
learning one's way about a bibliographical system. But the fact is that for many people the
study and practice of law are both difficult and
fascinating. Second, since the rules that must be
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memorize4 are not invented at the law schools
but exist outside of them, generally available to
the world at large, there would be no substantial
or interesting difference between a good legal
education and a poor one. (Indeed, it would not
be plain under these circumstances why we
should have law schools or formal legal training
at all. We could publish lists of rules and
examine students on their "knowledge" of them
at a bar examination.) And if this view of the law
were accurate, there would be little to distinguish a good lawyer from a poor one. But there
is general agreement, among those who claim to
know, that a good legal education is something
important and special, something very difficult
to attain; that a good lawyer has capacities and
powers the poor one lacks; and that in this field
as in others excellence is rare and valuable.
The third consequence of this simple view of
the law would be that the case method"learning the law by reading cases"-would
seem bizarre and perhaps sadistic. Why should
one read these complicated and difficult cases
simply to discover the general propositions for
which they stand? But a great many lawyers regard their experience of learning how to read a
case as a step of huge importance in their education as minds and as people, involving much
more than learning to discover and repeat rules.
Some, at least, would say that this training has
helped them to find in the material of their daily
professional existence a set of puzzles and difficulties that can interest them for life.
In my view, and I think in that of my colleagues here, the simple model of the law with
which I began is right only in the sense that it
describes how the law sometimes works in the
world; wholly wrong as a conception of the field
of study and practice with which you are about
to become engaged. For it is in the main only
when things seem or threaten not to work in
such easy and direct ways that lawyers are called
upon to act. Our primary field of concern is the
problematic and complex in the law, not the
simple and orderly.
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Let me suggest that you regard thq law not as
a set of rules to be memorized but as an activity,
as something that people do, with their minds
and with each other, as they act in relation both
to a body of authoritative legal material and to
the circumstances and events of the actual
world. The law is a set of social and intellectual
practices that defines a universe or culture in
which you will learn to function; like other important activities, it offers its practitioner the
opportunity to make a life, to work out a character, for herself or for himself. What you will
learn in law school, on this view, is not information in the usual sense, not a set of repeatable
propositions, but how to do something. Our
primary aim is not to transmit information to
you, but to help you learn how to do what it is
that lawyers do with the problems that come to
them. In the course of all this you must necessarily acquire a great deal of information, much of
it essential to your training, and some of it will
come from your teachers. But the acquisition of
such information is incidental, not central. As a
professor once said, "I am not a data bank; what
I hope to be is a teacher."
Of course the law as an activity can and should
be studied-and is studied at this law schoolfrom the point of view of other disciplines. The
operations of lawyers and the legal system can
be studied by the anthropologist, the economist,
the historian, the literary or rhetorical critic, the
psychiatrist, the philosopher, the social theorist,
and many other specialists. But in studying the
law in such ways one is functioning not as a
lawyer but as an anthropologist, as an historian,
and so forth. What is peculiar and central to
your experience in law school and beyond is
learning how to participate in this activity not as
an academic but as a legal mind.*
*1 do not mean to suggest that all of you will or should
choose to become lawyers by career. Some of you may have
very different goals. But I assume that you all want to learn
the law. And what I am saying for all of you is that the most
important thing that you can learn here is not what the rules
say, but what it is that the lawyers and judges do and should
do with the materials of the law.
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It might help if you were to compare the process of learning law not so much with your other
experiences of the classroom as with your experiences of learning in ordinary life: learning
to swim, to sail, to ski, to fly-fish, to understand
music or art, to play poker or bridge, or to carry
on a conversation at a lunchcounter or a cocktail
party. How would you describe what learning to
engage in such activities involved for you? To
what extent does it make sense to say that what
you did was to "acquire information" in the
usual sense? What else did you do beyond that?
Let me address one of these analogies. Suppose that you were asked to teach a person how
to sail a boat, and that you proceeded by explaining the names of the parts of the boat, how
the various parts operated, and the principles
on which they functioned. Suppose your student learned to repeat perfectly what you had
said. What would he or she know about sailing?
One summer I tried to teach people to sail that
way, and what I found is that even those who
could repeat what I said did not understand it;
that when they got into a boat and felt it move
and shift on the water, the sails shake and fill in
the wind, they had no real idea what to do. Of
course the information I offered was useful to
one who wishes to sail, but it could only begin to
be meaningful when he understood something
about sailing. I am suggesting that knowing the
rules of the law is like knowing the names for
the parts of the boat; it is useful information
which teaches little about the enterprise itself.
Or consider fly-fishing or a golf swing: what do
you know when you can explain the structure of
the equipment and the principles upon which it
is used, when a cast or a swing has been described to you, but before you yourself have
tried it? To learn law one must do law. It is the
function of our classes to help you learn how to
do law.
A more complete analogy may be learning a
language. One must of course know the rules of
grammar and the meanings of terms, but to
know those things is not to know how to speak
5

the language; that knowledge comes only with
use. The real difficulties and pleasures lie not in
knowing the rules of French or of law, but in
knowing how to speak the language, how to
make sense of it, how to use it to serve your
purposes in life. One's knowledge of a language,
like one's knowledge of the law, is never complete. Again and again one hears new sentences
and new terms; one sees, with surprise and pleasure, new operations and new moves. The
speaker of ordinary competence himself constantly invents new ways to use the language. It
is said that the most effective way to teach a
language is to immerse the student in the culture, to start him speaking and talking and reading the language before he "knows" anything
about the language. Then it is always a language, and not a scheme, not a subject, that he is
learning. It is a similar perception which underlies the way we teach law.
In both language and law, learning has a double focus: if one is to live and act competently in
a particular culture, one simply must learn how
the language-or the law-is in fact spoken by
others, by those whom one wishes to address, to
persuade, to learn from, and to live with. But
one also wishes to learn how to turn the language, or the law, to one's own purposes: to invent new sentences, to have new ideas, to do new
things, perhaps to change the nature of the language itself. Your concern in law school is thus a
double one: to learn as completely as you can
how the legal culture functions; and to establish
a place for yourself in relation to it from which
you can attempt to use it in your own ways-in
ways that increase your capacities and powers,
ways that enable you to speak truthfully to the
conditions of the world and to take positions
(and offer them to others) which seem to you to
be right. In doing all this you will subject your
own views and inclinations to the discipline of
the inherited culture and the conditions of the
world; and you will have a chance, sometimes,
not only to maintain but to improve the culture
of which you become a part.
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What I have said may perhaps suggest an explanation 6f what we call the "case method" of
learning law, that is, by studying actual cases in
which the law can be seen in action rather than
by memorizing general principles or rules. It is
true that the cases you will read in your courses
can usually be said to stand for one or more
propositions of law, and cases are often referred
to that way by a lawyer writing a brief or by a
judge in his opinion. But it is not primarily to
learn those propositions of law (which may indeed be, in your view or that of others, erroneous) that you read those cases. Cases in your
casebooks are offered to you as the occasion for
individual and collective thought, as genuine
problems for the mind and heart. Each opinion
is the final stage of a complicated series of legal
events. You are asked to reconstruct these
events in your imagination so that you can participate in them at second hand; pretending now
that you are the seller, now the buyer, now one
of the lawyers, now the other, now a judge, now
a legislator. "What would I have done here and
why?" is your constant question and test.
This experience can be regarded as an
idealized apprenticeship, as an intellectual training in the experience of the law, and it has its
roots in our traditions. As you may know, it was
once the custom in this country for a lawyer to
learn the law by doing it, as a clerk or apprentice
to an established lawyer. One can of course
learn to do the law that way, and such a training
has many merits for one who wishes to learn the
language of the law. But the material which
comes into any one lawyer's office is not selected
or structured to train the student in a wide
range of activities; and one is stuck with an early
and necessarily untutored choice of a single instructor. The idealized or imaginary apprentice
system which the case method entails thus has
the advantages of coverage, structure, and, may
it also be said, unreality. The mistakes you make
as you first try to do law are, under this system,
harmless ones.
Your apprenticeship is idealized in another,
7

perhaps to you less attractive, way, for your
teachers are not themselves primarily engaged
in the busy life of clients and cases-though
most of them once were-but are people who
think about and participate in the law in a different way, as what we call writers or scholars.
We cannot, as a group, pretend to offer you
what seasoned and experienced practitioners
would, and perhaps it is appropriate to say
something of what we think we can offer. What
our position gives us is the chance to stand back
from the world of detail and practice and to try
to find something to see in it, something to say
about it of a more general and worked out kind
than would likely emerge from the press of a life
in practice. At this school it is widely felt that
good teaching requires a critical and creative
engagement with the subject taught, for it is
only when the teacher can regard the material as
meaning or exemplifying something, as a field
for the operation of his or her independent intelligence, that it becomes in any but a mechanical way teachable. Our writing is, among other
things, the record of our engagement with the
law, an engagement of a more general and reflective kind than we enjoyed in practice. We
hope that this engagement will deepen our engagement with you.
We do not purport to be able to teach you
everything you want to know, as lawyers or as
people. It is of course true that, if you apply
yourself, there are many things you will be able
to do and do well when you graduate. But our
function cannot be to create maturely competent practicing lawyers, for no one has figured
out how to do that in three years. Perhaps our
object in this respect could be said to be to prepare you to make the most of your actual experience of the law at work in the world when
the time comes, to see more and learn more
than you otherwise would. If you go into law
practice in a firm after law school you will find
that the apprenticeship system continues, for a
good law office puts a very high priority on teach8

ing its young, and a recent law graduate has a
great deal to learn.
To return to your present situation: what
does the conception of the process of law school
I have outlined above mean for you? What
should you do, for example, when you read a
case? What sorts of questions should you expect
your teacher to ask of you, and how should you
prepare to respond to them?
The first thing to understand is that the judicial opinion that you read in your casebook is
the last stage of a long and complicated process.
This kind of literature, which will form the bulk
of your first year reading, is the cultural deposit
or artefact left behind by weeks or months or
years of work by actual people in the real world,
from which it is your task to learn-to figure
out-as much as you can about the activity of
law. It is a little as if you were given the last
chapter of a novel and asked to imagine what
went before. A prodigious task.
In my view, the best way to proceed is
chronologically. Begin by trying to reconstruct
from the opinion, so far as you can, the facts
that occurred in the real world before any
lawyer was brought into play. Tell the story
chronologically, without any terms of legal conclusion. You should try to create a movie of life,
a story of the experience of ordinary people in
the ordinary world. Reflect in your story how
each of the participants would characterize the
events in his ordinary language. This is the experience upon which the law will be asked to act
in its peculiar and powerful ways, and for which
the various people of the law will claim
particular-and competing-legal meanings.
You will probably discover that your knowledge of the facts is less than complete. Ask yourself what additional facts you would like to
know, and why. Here you can pretend that you
are a lawyer representing one of the clients, and
ask yourself what questions you would put to
him about what happened. This is, after all,
what a lawyer does when a client comes into his
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office and tells his story. The clientbelieves he
has told the whole thing. The lawyer examinei
and reexamines the story, asking questions and
more questions until he is satisfied that he ha
"enough" to enable him to turn to his books;
what he reads there will suggest new questions
to which the answers will suggest new lines ol
legal inquiry, and so it goes, a jostling betweer
the facts and the law throughout the life of the
case. You can at least begin this process witt
every case you read.
The next stage of reconstruction is to ask (sc
far as you can determine from the opinion tha
you read) what each lawyer did, why you thinl
he did that, and what you would have done ir
his place. One lawyer, for example, initiated the
judicial process by filing a complaint, whicli
necessarily rests upon one or more lega
theories. What were the legal theories? Arc
these the legal theories that you would have as.
serted? Is he properly in this court rather thar
another, and why, if he had a choice of courts,
did he choose this one? What relief does he seek
and why? How else might you have acted on
behalf of the plaintiff in the case? After the firsi
lawyer acted, the second lawyer responded b)
filing an answer or motion in response to the
complaint. How did the second lawyer respondi
What would you have considered doing and
why? Could the lawyers have anticipated theii
difficulties by sound planning or more skillfu
drafting? Is there a negotiated solution the)
seem to have overlooked? You are asked to pui
yourself in the place of each of the parties and
each of the lawyers and ask yourself how yot
would have behaved, how you would have
interpreted and responded to the events whici
underlie the case.
Almost all of the judicial opinions in youi
casebook are explanations of decisions reachec
in appellate proceedings. In these, an appellate
court is asked to approve or disapprove the de.
cisions made by a judge at the trial of the case
(or at some stage prior to trial). The evidence
available to you on these matters is ofter
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skimpy, bu you should try, so far as you can, to
reconstruct the course of the proceeding whose
result is in question or appeal. Can you figure
out what each lawyer did? How would you have
acted in his place? What actions of the trial court
are claimed by the appellant to be erroneous,
and why? Can you see other actions which you
would have designated as error on appeal? On
what theory would you have done so?
The appellant's designations of error usually
define the issue or issues on appeal. Frequently
the issues so defined will be stated by the court,
and the arguments of counsel summarized, explicitly or implicitly. At this stage ask yourself:
what arguments would you have advanced for
each side? Why? How do you evaluate the arguments you would make?
At the end you read an opinion that explains
the judgment in the case, and here you face the
hardest questions of all: How would you decide
this case? How would you explain and defend
your judgment? At this stage, the process of the
law is no longer, if it ever was, a matter of
rhetorical skill and intellectual deftness. It is a
matter of judging right and wrong, better and
worse, of coming to terms with the necessity and
difficulty of judgment. The simple question"How should this case be decided?"-presents a
puzzle and a challenge that can occupy a life.
You can take it, then, that part of your training in this school is a training in a special kind of
reading. Not "reading for the main idea," as you
may have learned in high school, and certainly
not reading for maximum content acquisition in
the minimum time, but reading as a species of
thought, with a reconstructive and critical imagination. What can you see here, we ask, and
what can you make of it? What seems at first
easy enough becomes, as you study it, perplexing; simplicity becomes complicated. This
should not surprise you. A football game-or a
single move in it, say a block or a tackle-is simple enough to the mere fan, complex indeed to
the coach or scout; beauty in music is one thing
to the ordinary listener, quite another to the cri11

tic or performer or composer. So !t is with a
case, read not as an exemplification of a rule,
but as a deposit of the processes of the world in
which experience continually frustrates expectation, in which facts and arguments seem inexhaustible and inconclusive. So it is with a statute or regulation, read not as the statement of a
general idea, but with a critical and inventive eye
for the problematic case which will expose uncertainty or incoherence in what may at first
seem a plain and clear statement.
In your classes you can expect your teachers
to ask you to describe as accurately as the materials permit what happened at each stage of the
process by which a case was made, how the
lawyers behaved, and what you would have
done in their place. It is especially important for
you to understand and to be able to state clearly
the arguments made by each lawyer on appeal,
and to see where each could be said to be defective.
The arguments you present in class will be
met by other students and you will be asked to
respond to what they say. It is thus not enough
for you to state the issues and arguments as the
lawyers and judges do; you must be prepared to
suggest new lines of thought, new arguments,
and to find new defects. You must be prepared
to present your own resolution of the difficulties
you see, not only with a responsiveness to the
claims of these parties, but with a sensitivity to
the meaning of the case, as you would decide it,
for parties and lawyers and judges in future
cases, including those who will try to plan their
affairs in legitimate ways to avoid litigation in
the future. You are responsible at the moment
for the case as a whole.
All of this may be a most frightening prospect
to you. How can you evaluate what the lawyers
did when you haven't even been to law school
yet? How can you substitute your opinion for
that of an experienced and competent judge?
Of course you can not expect yourself to function at the beginning as an accomplished lawyer.
But you are asked to learn by doing, just as one
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learns a lanouage by speaking it. Of course, your
first efforts will be halting, you will misunderstand things, you will make errors. That is not
your fault; it resides in the nature of things.
Your teachers know all this, and while you
may sometimes understandably feel that the
persistent and impossible demands of the classroom are intended to operate as a sort of bootcamp discipline or hazing exercise, that is not
our purpose at all. The cases are hard for us as
well as for you, sometimes I think harder for us
than for you; our task is to lead a conversation,
by question and observation, which will expose
the difficulties of our common circumstance, the
perplexities that do not at first appear. It is important for you to know that these are
perplexities for all of us, and that your teachers
have no handy solutions to purvey. To the extent that our own views on the merits of particular questions obtrude with indecent plainness,
you are encouraged to give them no more
weight than they in your view deserve; to treat
them, that is, just as if they were the views of a

fellow student, which indeed they are. The difference between your teacher and you, after
all, is only that he has read the case more often,
thought about it longer, and has a somewhat
larger set of legal materials to bring to bear on it.
He has no patent from above that will guarantee
his being right. And you can have no assurance,
whatever he says, that he will not change his
mind. The legal mind is marked, one might say,
by an odd combination of three things: a capacity to organize the materials of argument, with
great force, on either side of a question; a willingness to reach and state a conclusion; and an
openness to persuasion that one is wrong. Law
school is among other things an experience of
making up and changing your mind. Behind all
the rhetorical force is a deep sense of the tentative.
The truth is that there are no experts in the
law, in the sense that there are no persons upon
whose judgment you may rely without understanding it; each of us is responsible for what he
13

thinks and says, and it is no discharge of your
duty to repeat to your professor what he has
told you he thinks. You must make your own
way.
It may or may not be comforting to hear this,
but the sense of inadequacy and isolation which
you should have as you now contemplate this
process will always, in one form or another, be
with you. One never knows all the law; one
never feels wholly confident about any step
taken in the law. The lawyer lives in an uncertain and indeterminate world, and his profession is to survive and flourish in it. To return
to the sailing analogy, while you are sailing you
can no longer plant your feet firmly on the
ground, and proceed by certain steps in a certain direction; but you can sail a boat on the
water.
There is another way to put my point. The
sense of isolation you now have is in large part
the burden of acknowledged responsibility for
what you do with the law. That sense of
responsibility-which will be most acute when
you find yourself making real decisions which
actually affect the property, lives, and interests
of other people-is central to the experience of
the lawyer. I hope you feel it now. One way to
state what I urge upon you is this: take the view
that you have now spent the last day of your life
as a "student of a subject" in the ordinary sense,
as a student whose education is the responsibility of a school. Put your school days behind you. From this day on, you are a professional person, responsible alone for your own
education; for the improvement of your mind;
and for the judgments that you make in the
world you will inhabit. What this means in practical terms for you as a new law student is that
you should work hard on your cases, in the way
suggested above, rather than looking for answers elsewhere. You should participate in class,
both directly and imaginatively; if you are not
asked to respond to a question, pretend that you
are. When another person speaks, ask yourself
how you would respond to him. Don't be afraid
14

to be foolish or to be wrong; when your concern
is how you can function in the law, there is nothing to be gained by hiding what you are. When
you talk with other students about the law outside of class, try to talk as colleagues, teaching
each other outside of class as you learn in it.
I would now like to make a general remark
about the view of legal education I have offered
you. On the one hand it is, as I have just
suggested, a genuinely professional education,
in which you are asked to function as a professional from the first day you begin. You are
asked not only to do what a professional does,
but to have the attitude a professional has and to
meet professional standards. In order to survive
and succeed in the world defined by what
lawyers do, you must learn how to do those
things well. In that sense, you are all asked to
learn the same thing: the conventions of that
branch of our culture which consist of the activity of law. But, as I have defined it, your legal
education is not merely a professional education. It is also a liberal education in the deepest
sense. Our ultimate concern is not with your
competence at imitating what others do, at
learning the moves the lawyer must know; but
with the development of your own capacities,
sensitivities, and styles, based on a just recognition of the powers and limits of the human
mind. As you work through the material of the
law, now and later, you make judgments and
choices, you write and say sentences, that fashion a character for yourself out of experience.
You will learn both how to function in an inherited culture, as a member of it, and how to function at the same time as yourself. How you do
this, as I have said, is your responsibility; our
task is to offer you a world in which you can
begin to work out your own double identity, as
lawyer and as mind.
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